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ARFORGEN: MEANS TO AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE
The Nation has been at a state of national emergency for nine and a half years. As a result, the Army has had continuous access to the reserve component through partial mobilization. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have performed magnificently, and the relationship between the components is better than it has ever been. Our Soldiers have fought together and bled together, and more than ever, we are one Army, a Total Force. Our Nation cannot lose the enormous gains we have made 
Background
To meet the operational demands of the past ten years, the U.S. Army Reserve has evolved from a culture of a strategic reserve to that of an operational reserve. "One thing is for certain across every echelon of this Army; we cannot relegate the Army National Guard and Army Reserve back to a strategic reserve. The security of the nation can ill afford a reserve force that is under-manned, under-equipped or at insufficient levels of training and readiness." 3 The 2011 Army Posture Statement clearly describes the need for an enduring operational reserve to meet future national security challenges in an era of persistent conflict and a period of constrained resources.
However, as the budget crunch looms, some analysts are claiming that a strategic reserve may be an option for reducing the defense budget. However, although an operational reserve is more expensive than a strategic one, an operational reserve can save defense dollars by meeting requirements that otherwise would be provided by the active component. This analysis will consider this value added by maintaining a robust operational reserve.
Strategic Reserve
A definition of the strategic reserve and a review of lessons learned from recent mobilizations are critical to understanding why ARFORGEN and an operational reserve are important to the Army. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks the Army Reserve was viewed as a strategic reserve. For the purposes of this paper, a strategic reserve is defined as a force that maintains readiness by means of a tiered system, based on projected future demands. Funds were allocated to Army Reserve units for training, manning, and equipping based on when they would be required for mobilization in the event of an emerging contingency. Units in the lower tiers were often fiscally neglected; they were regarded as potential donors of personnel and equipment to units in the upper tiers. Units with greater budgets had the resources to offer Soldiers additional training; they were generally better equipped and manned.
In a strategic reserve, the typical Army Reserve Soldier would participate in battle assemblies one weekend per month and in 14 days (not necessarily congruent) of annual training. Units in the higher tiers with larger budgets could fund Soldiers for as many as 29 days of annual training. In addition to annual training, Reserve Soldiers could be offered extended schooling paid for with Active Duty for Training (ADT)
funding. Yet another resource for units in the upper echelons was Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) funding, which could be used for projects deemed to enhance readiness. Soldiers in the units with smaller budgets were provided funds only for the statutory annual 24 days of battle assemblies and 14 days of annual training.
Proponents of a return to a strategic reserve cite the success of the Army
Reserve during the mobilization that occurred in the months following the 9/11 attacks.
However, proponents of this option are overlooking the disruption and turbulence caused by the transition of a strategic force to one mobilized for extended contingency operations. This turmoil impacted the entire force; from the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) down to individual reserve Soldiers.
The extent to which this tiered system was flawed became immediately evident as the USARC began the process of alerting units for mobilization. At home stations, and at the mobilization stations across the country that provided Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP), deployability issues of Soldiers and consequently of units soon emerged. But Army leaders did not quickly identify deficiencies across all tiers and within both components of the reserve force. Medical and dental issues were contributing to non-deployability rates approaching 30 percent. 4 Regardless of tier, the number of non-participants or "Ghost Soldiers" (Soldiers assigned in a reserve status but not participating in accord with statutory requirements) added to the false perception of manning readiness. Duty Military Occupational Skills Qualification (DMOSQ) percentages were low due to an assignment process in which Soldiers were assigned to units based on proximity to their home, rather than to units for which they were qualified.
Army leaders relied on unrealistic assumptions as they set mobilization timelines for units in the upper tiers. They assumed that units in the upper tiers would require less time to prepare for deployment at the mobilization stations. In reality, National 
Units categorized as Levels 1-3. 1 = most difficult to train, 3 = least difficult There is some level of risk which must be considered when making budgeting decision regarding DEF and CEF designation for the reserve components. Also, this designation impacts Soldiers, their families and employers.
USAR CEF Strategy
The USAR CEF strategy divides its 24.6k available forces in each force pool into three levels. Units are assigned to a given level based on their capability to achieve training level two (T2) before entering the available force pool as the mission force.
Level 1units require more training than level 2 units to achieve a T2 readiness level.
Level 1units are comprised of brigade and higher headquarters along with other more specialized units such as signal battalions, medical units, Civil Affairs, and aviation.
These units require an additional six days of annual training in T/R2 and T/R3 to achieve a T2 readiness level. These additional training days allows them to participate in a 21-day exercise in both of these training years. Approximately 5400 Soldiers are assigned to the units in level 1. Level 2 is comprised of units that require fewer resources than level 1units. Level 2 units require only six additional days of training in T/R3 to achieve T2 prior to entering the available force pool. Most units assigned to level 2 are battalion and company-size organizations. Some 14,000 Soldiers are assigned to these units. Level 3 units require the least amount of resources to achieve T2 prior to entering the available force pool. These units are typically smaller than companies and can achieve T2 by conducting all train during statutory annual training and battle assemblies. Some 5200 Soldiers are assigned to units in level 3.
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The estimated annual funding required to achieve the desired readiness levels for CEF units is 250 million dollars. 20 This estimate covers the additional training mandays, but not the operational costs of employment in the available year. At this time, this funding issue has not been resolved.
Aim Points
The Army has developed Aim Points as a means to measure the progression of units through the ARFORGEN Cycle. The Aim Points provide goals for unit commanders to achieve and are similar to metrics used in Unit Status Reporting criteria:
personnel (P), equipment on hand(S), maintenance readiness(R), and training (T). The (PCC), Professional Military Education (PME), and acquisition of at least 70% of assigned equipment. 22 Commanders continue to monitor the medical and dental processing and readiness of all Soldiers assigned. 23 The resulting Aim Point goals for the end of T/R2 differ for DEF and CEF. The significance of this difference is the training readiness rating of T3 for CEF force vice T4 for units in the DEF force pool.
The Personnel readiness goals at this Aim Point are P2 for DEF and P3 for the CEF.
T/R 2 is the first year which level 1 units require the additional 6 days of funding which must be reflected their annual training budgets. of readiness requirements. 24 Commanders continue to monitor the medical and dental processing and readiness of all Soldiers assigned. 25 The Aim Point goals for the end of T/R3 are T3 for DEF and T2 for CEF force pool. The Personnel readiness goals at Aim Point 4 are P1 for DEF and P2 for the CEF. Both level-1 and level-2 units require an additional 6 days of annual training during this phase. These 12 days must be appropriately funded.
After achieving the readiness goals at Aim Point 4, units move into the available force pool as the designated mission force. DEF units will attend a 60-day postmobilization training regimen conducted by First Army at one of the enduring mobilization stations. They will then meet their LAD and complete a 9-month BOG for their operational contingency mission. This is followed by a 30-day demobilization and leave period. The Army's goal for DEF forces is to move from a 400-day mobilization order to a 365-day mobilization order.
CEF Mission Sets Capabilities
CEF forces will conduct their pre-planned mission in the available year. The duration of these missions is subject to available funding and any changes in authorities 
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Transition to a Supply-Based Model
In order to transition from a traditional strategic reserve to an operational reserve which deploys using the ARFORGEN model, the USARC must balance demand-based requirements, driven by combatant commanders, to a supply based system driven by available forces. Determination of deployment timelines and sourcing is currently based on a process using Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) pools which lump units into packages without an actual date for mobilization and follow-on deployment. Information System. Additionally, there is the requirement to manually feed information to complete the merger and stand up AST. This data base will be available at the battalion level in both classified and unclassified formats. 30 The completion of this data base merger and the utilization of AST is a critical component in the development of ARFORGEN as a viable tool for enabling an operational reserve for the future. 34 Predictability is essential for the ARFORGEN model and the operational reserve concept to become an enduring reality. In order for this strategy to be successful employers, Soldiers, and families must buy-in to the process.
Employer support for units and Soldiers being employed as part of the CEF force pool is another challenge which needs to be further studied. The USAR Vision and Strategy Statement states: "The Army Reserve has determined that civilian employers will support emergency and predictable absences of Army Reserve Soldiers from the workplace". 35 The extent to which rigor was applied in making this determination should be further explored. The study should ensure a censing of a variety of employers from large private sector organizations, small business owners, local, state and federal government organizations.
Private sector companies with large workforces may be more likely to support a Soldier's absence for predictable CEF missions not associated with a named contingency. Small business employers who will be impacted to a greater degree by the Soldier's absence may be less inclined to support such employment without the weight of the law in support of the Soldier. In addition to statutory changes, there should be incentives and benefits offered to employers to assist in countering the loss of productivity from the RC service member. These incentives could be in the form of tax breaks, education and training assistance for employees, and recognition of their support to the nation.
Integral to Retaining an All-Volunteer force in the reserve component is the Army's ability to retain the Army families from which these Soldiers draw their support.
The USAR and the Army have taken steps to ensure programs available to active component families living on or near installations are also available to reserve component families whom are generally more geographically dispersed and often far from supporting installations. The Army must fight to retain these programs and initiatives.
Many of the challenges facing the Army Reserve as it transitions to a supplybased system in an operational reserve involve the process of manning units. The extensive cross leveling, filling Worldwide Individual Augmentee vacancies, voluntary mobilizations, and medical readiness are all issues that require solutions to improve the manning for ARFORGEN. As the war in Iraq concludes and as the peace dividend is realized in the form of decreased demand for mobilized Soldiers, addressing these issues in a manner that is both feasible and acceptable will become more attainable.
The first step is to continue to communicate the vision and strategy for implementing an operational reserve. Commanders at all levels must be on board with the operational reserve concept and eliminate the mindset of the strategic reserve when dealing with unfit, non-participants, and non-performing Soldiers in the ranks.
The USARC G1 must continue to revise its assignments process to one that is based more on the needs of the Army Reserve and less on distance. A new Army
Reserve Soldier or one that is new to an area should be placed into a unit closest to home where there is a requirement for that Soldiers qualifications and skill sets. As an example: a Military Police DMOSQ qualified Soldier should not be assigned to an engineer company seven miles from his residence when there is a requirement in a
Military Police unit thirty miles from his residence. There should be a system, (perhaps regional), and led by USARC in which units come together and scrub rosters to adjudicate such mismatches in the assignment process. 36 This could be a recurring process to ensure an early calibration, and will require continuous over site until a centrally managed system can be emplaced.
As with the potential changes to policy and legislation for access, funding is 
